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ABSTRACT
The dispute settlement regime between investors and states
through ad hoc arbitration has come under heavy criticism in the
past few decades. More recently, these critiques have escalated to
the extent that the international community is considering
replacing it with a completely new scheme that includes a
permanent tribunal to settle such disputes. An intermediate
approach to reforming the system the establishment of an
appellate body aimed at providing consistency to the numerous ad
hoc arbitration awards is also being considered. As a third
option, the arbitration community, as well as other stakeholders
interested in maintaining the ad hoc regime, are working to reform
it by addressing only some of its flaws, while preserving its
fundamental characteristics. This article analyzes the main
criticisms of the current dispute settlement regime between
investors and states and carries out a comparison between the three
polic reform options, ho the are intended to solve the s stem s
flaws, as well as the implications arising from each of those
options.
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Introduction

The current Investor-State Dispute Settlement System
(ISDS) was created to allow foreign investors to bring claims
directly against the states where the investors placed their
investments. It began to provide foreign investors with a set of
rules for resolving disputes in cases where the states hosting their
investments do not comply with the terms of an international
investment agreement (IIA). Its purpose is to protect foreign
investors by providing them with an enforceable mechanism in the
case of discrimination, expropriation, or any other restrictions of
their rights under the IIA. Before the ISDS, disputes about foreign
investment were settled either through domestic courts or
diplomatic channels, here the investor s state of citi enship
would bring a case against the state where the investment was
located.3
The first proposal for an ISDS, known as the Abs-Shawcross
See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty
Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 Am. J. Int l La 179 (2010).
3
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Draft Convention, emerged during the late 1950s as a formulation
from a group of European businesspersons and jurists, without any
participation from governments. 4 Among the main arguments in
favor of the ISDS was the perception that a reliance on domestic
systems would only hold merit in countries with sound legal
systems, good governance, and effective local courts.5 Thus, from
the investors perspective, instead of settling foreign investment
disputes before often biased and unsophisticated domestic courts in
(developing) host states, most IIAs allowed them to move around
the national courts of the host state to international arbitration
proceedings.6
Moreover, the ISDS safeguards the investors interests in cases
where political considerations in their home countries impede that
state from confronting the state hosting the investment.7 From the
point of vie of the investor s state, the mechanism prevents
disputes concerning individuals from becoming a motive for
divergence between sovereign states. From the perspective of the
host states, the ISDS avoids possible retaliation from the investor s
state, which could materialize even in areas outside the scope of
the investment.
This proposal, commonly portrayed as a mechanism to protect
foreign investors, proved attractive to capital-exporting countries
as it served as inspiration for the dispute settlement mechanism in
the IIA, as prescribed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).8 Ever since, this type of IIA
has been presented to developing countries as a vehicle for

See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 72 (Oxford Univ.Press 2nd ed. 2012)
(ebook).
5 See Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, 2
UNCTAD 1, 7 (2013)
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf.
6 See Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos?: Foreign Investment Law as a
Complex Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29
ICSID REVIEW 372, 394 (2014).
7 Id.
8 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4.
4
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attracting foreign investment.
However, after almost six decades of existence, the correlation
between Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), ISDS clauses and
investment attraction is yet to be proven. 9 Yet, the dramatic
increase in the number of disputes involving investors and states
leaves no room to doubt that the ISDS mechanism has served the
alleged purpose of protecting investments.10 Nonetheless, the ISDS
system has garnered numerous criticisms, as shown in the
following section, and no longer forms a consensus, even among
capital-exporting countries.
The Emergence of a New Paradigm
In the context of the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the European Union (EU) proposed
to address the fundamental and idespread lack of trust for the
ISDS by introducing an Investment Court System (ICS) to resolve
disputes between investors and states. 11 Initially, the ICS was to be
An extensive study recently conducted by the Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment (CCSI) concluded that the evidence that investment treaties have
the effect of increasing investment flo s is inconclusive and the common
assumptions about the role of [bilateral investment treaties (BITs)] in attracting
foreign investment are unsupported by a considerable amount of quantitative
and qualitative evidence . See Lise Johnson et al., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
STATES 6 (2018). See generally Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation, 2255 Munich
Personal RePEc Archive (2007); Jason W. Yackee, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs
Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC Y REV. 805-832 (2008).;
Lauge Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and
Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence, Y.B. INT L INV. LAW & POL Y
539-574 (2010); Joachim Pohl, Societal benefits and costs of International
Investment Agreements: A critical review of aspects and available empirical
evidence, OECD Working Papers on Int l Inv. (2018).
10 See KYLA TIENHAARA, Investor State dispute settlement, REGULATORY
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 676 (Peter Drahos, 2017).
11 Cecilia Malmstrom, Proposing an Investment Court System European
Commission (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/20142019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-court-system_en (last visited Mar
16, 2018).
9
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incorporated in bilateral agreements as is already the case for the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU
and Canada (CETA), and other treaties between the EU and
Vietnam, Mexico, and Singapore. Eventually, the courts created
under these agreements would be replaced by the Multilateral
Investment Court (MIC).
Discussions over ISDS reform are already ongoing in Working
Group III (WG III) of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), whose mandate is
separated into three phases, namely to: i) identify concerns
regarding the ISDS;12 (ii) consider whether reform is desirable in
light of any identified concerns;13 and if the Working Group
concludes that reform is desirable, (iii) develop any relevant
solutions to be recommended to the Commission. 14
As stated by the secretariat of WG III during its thirty fourth
session in November 2017, the options for reform range from a
minor adjustment of the existing ad hoc system to the creation of
In the first phase of its mandate, the WG III concluded that the concerns
commonly expressed about the existing ISDS regime include (i) inconsistency in
arbitral decisions, (ii) limited mechanisms to ensure the correctness of arbitral
decisions, (iii) lack of predictability, (iv) appointment of arbitrators by parties
( part -appointment ), (v) the impact of part -appointment on the impartiality
and independence of arbitrators, (vi) lack of transparency, and (vii) increasing
duration and costs of the procedure. Report of Working Group III (InvestorState Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-sixth session,
UNCITRAL 1, 5, 7, 10, 16 (2018),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draft_report_of_wg_iii_for_the_
website.pdf (last visited Jan 16, 2019).
13 As of the last session of its thirty-sixth session, the WG III concluded that a
reform is desirable. From the thirty seventh session on, the WG III will address
the relevant solutions to recommend to the commission. Report of Working
Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirtysixth session, UNCITRAL (2018),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draft_report_of_wg_iii_for_the_
website.pdf (last visited Jan 16, 2019). Id. at 1, 8.
14 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group
III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform), UNCITRAL (2017), 1, 3
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V17/067/48/PDF/V1706748.pdf?OpenElement
(last visited Jan 16, 2019).
12
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an appellate body, or even establishing a permanent court to settle
disputes regarding international investments. 15
The Establishment Strikes Back
Concurrently, amid ongoing discussions held by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) the orld s leading institution devoted to international
investment dispute settlement launched an amendment process
and invited its Member States and the general public to suggest
topics that merit consideration for reform. Among others, the list of
topics for possible amendment envisages modifications that
enhance transparency, access to justice, the independence and
impartiality of arbitrators, the consistency of awards, and the
duration and cost-effectiveness of the proceedings. 16 There are
similarities between the list of concerns identified by UNCITRAL
WG III and the topics for possible amendment from the ICSID,
showing that reform is symptomatic and that the ICSID wants to
address those concerns and improve its functioning before the
crisis intensifies and more damages come to the fore.
Three possible outcomes could arise from the abovementioned
ISDS reform initiatives. The success of the ongoing WG III
process could result in the creation of a permanent court, which
would be a radical departure from the current ad hoc system.
Extensive support for this prospective court would deliver a
significant blow to the existing ISDS mechanism. 17 In turn, the
creation of an appellate mechanism responsible for reviewing the
awards of ad hoc tribunals would represent an intermediate
solution, where the ad hoc tribunals would maintain part of their
adjudicatory authority, while transferring the other part to an
appellate body. In the third scenario, an ICSID amendment process
See Possible reform of Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group III (InvestorState Dispute Settlement Reform), UNCITRAL 1, 10-11 (2017),
https://undocs.org/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142.
16 See infra note 53. The complete list of areas for possible amendment is
described in greater detail.
17 The terms permanent court and International Court System (ICS) are used
interchangeably in this paper.
15
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would merely reform the ad hoc system, while maintaining its
main characteristics.
Each of these reform options presents different solutions to the
current ISDS crisis. Consequently, each of them has its advantages
and drawbacks. These three reform options affect the interests of
stakeholders in different ways, namely investors, states, and the
arbitration community. With the aim to assess the adequacy of the
reform options in light of identified concerns, the next section of
this paper will proceed with an analysis of the most commonly
identified flaws of the ISDS. After that, it shifts to assessing the
reform options and their likely outcomes, how they would affect
ISDS proceedings, and ho the ould address the s stem s
current challenges.
II.

The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Crisis

While many of its benefits are still valid, the ISDS mechanism
has presented several flaws that have raised questions about the
system. Thus, many initiatives have emerged that aim to cope with
some of the problems pointed out by commentators and
practitioners of international investment law. Despite several
changes to the IIAs and the arbitration institutions throughout the
years, central flaws still remain. 18 Some of these weaknesses cast
doubt on the s stem s abilit to attract investment or its capacit to
benefit both investors and host countries in a sustainable way.
Consequently, this section addresses the specific criticisms of the
s stem s capacit to conduct impartial and efficient procedures for
the settlement of investment-related disputes.
Same Facts, Similar Treaty Provisions

Different Outcomes

One of the main criticisms of ISDS proceedings is the
inconsistency of arbitral decisions. The cases are judged by a
variety of ad hoc tribunals, which is widely considered the
characteristic that most impedes the consistency and interpretive
continuity of case law. Therefore, ad hoc tribunals are intrinsically
inadequate to ensure the consistency of a system of standards or
the development of coherent case law. This is because its mission
18

See Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 408.
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is to resolve specific cases in a manner that the parties concerned
find satisfactory, irrespective of any contradictions within the
consolidated understanding or the consequences it could have on
future disputes.19
Moreover, some legal standards, due to their level of
abstraction, allow for different interpretations between arbitral
courts. The lack of clarity of the provisions contained in
investment agreements and the exponential increase in IIAs
containing ISDS provisions have raised the risk of conflicting
awards in parallel proceedings. This is because an investor
established in multiple countries can claim breaches of the same
IIA clause in any of their established countries and the state
hosting their investment. Thus, investors can seek relief through
multiple ad hoc tribunals for the same breach in a single
investment, hoping that at least one tribunal will issue an award
favorable to their interests.20
Under this dynamic, a single dispute can lead to the
undesirable situation for the international investment regime in
which the same facts and the same treaty provision give rise to
inconsistent arbitral decisions in different ad hoc tribunals.21 As a
result, the inconsistency of decisions creates uncertainties about
the meaning of key investment treaty provisions, leading to a lack
of predictability as to how these provisions will be interpreted in
the future.
Many Flaws, Little Accountability
Additionally, there are limited mechanisms to ensure the
correctness of arbitral decisions, which prevent the system from
overturning inconsistencies. ISDS awards are subject to revision or
annulment in very limited cases under the ICSID Convention. 22
See Mark Feldman, Investment Arbitration Appellate Mechanism Options:
Consistency, Accuracy, and Balance of Power, 32 ICSID REVIEW 1, 9, N.28
(2017).
20 See Roberts, supra note 3.
21 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 3.
22 Post-Award Remedies - ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Post-Award-RemediesConvention-Arbitration.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
19
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The only circumstance under which a revision can be required, as
stated by Arbitration Rule (AR) 51(1) of the ICSID Convention, is
the discover of some fact of such a nature as decisivel to affect
the award, provided that when the award was rendered that fact
was unknown to the Tribunal and to the applicant and that the
applicant s ignorance of that fact as not due to negligence. 23
As for requests for annulment, AR 52(1) of the ICSID
convention enumerates five circumstances for its application: a)
improper constitution of the tribunal, b) excess of power, c)
corruption, d) departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, and
e) failure to state the reasons on which the award is based.
Therefore, under the ICSID Convention, there is no possibility to
annul or correct an award, even after having identified manifest
errors of law. Furthermore, given that annulment committees are
created on an ad hoc basis for the purpose of a single dispute, these
may also arrive at inconsistent conclusions.24
Party Appointment, Impartiality and Independence
The party-appointment system is another issue that often
receives criticism for being inherently contradictory to the
obligation of arbitrators to be independent and impartial. The
insufficiency of these standards under the ICSID has been
identified as the cause of the numerous challenges placed against
arbitrators in recent disputes, 25 suggesting that disputing parties
often perceive a bias or predisposition among arbitrators toward a
specific outcome. 26 The fact that parties do not appear to only
choose arbitrators based on their experience and skills, but also
based on whether the arbitrator enhances their chances of winning
a case has given rise to a category of conflicts of interest known as
issue conflicts. 27 This refers to arbitrators who have repeatedly
See ICSID, supra note 22.
See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 3-4.
25 See Maria Nicole Cleis, The Independence and Impartiality of ICSID
Arbitrators, ANALYSIS OF EXISTING REFORM PROPOSALS 188 (2017) (eBook).
26 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 4.
27 See Cleis, supra note 24, at 191; see also David Gaukrodger & Kathryn
Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment
Policy Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 24
23
24
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acted as arbitrators or counsels in cases that raised similar issues,
allo ing the parties in the dispute to identif an arbitrator s
propensity to decide a case according to their interests.
One of the characteristics of the ISDS that promotes this issue
conflict is the fact that most cases are judged b a small group of
individuals, making it much easier for the parties to identify the
arbitrators positions. According to a stud conducted bet een
1972 and 2014, 419 different arbitrators sat on ICSID tribunals
throughout that time.28 Although more than half of these arbitrators
were appointed for only one case, 10 percent of them accounted for
half of the appointments.29 Similar research found that 247 of the
450 known ISDS disputes occurring in 2012 (not limited to ICSID)
were decided by only 15 arbitrators. 30
Identifying the propensity of an arbitrator toward certain
decisions is made easier by the fact that disputes over international
investment agreements repeatedly address a limited and uniform
number of legal provisions. 31 In addition to the small group of
professionals that act as arbitrators and the reduced number of
uniform substantive rules discussed before arbitral tribunals, the
fact that earlier arbitration decisions are often used as interpretive
norms in subsequent cases further allows parties to foresee
arbitrators arguments for future cases. 32 Therefore, by surveying
awards issued by arbitrators in past cases, the parties in the dispute
can foresee the position arbitrators are likely to adopt in a future
case.
As for the arbitrators, their impartiality is commonly
questioned for having incentives to favor either investors or states
(2012).
28 Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 The European
Journal of International Law 387, 403 (2014).
29 Id.
30 Pia Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from injustice. How law firms,
arbitrators and financiers are fueling an investment arbitration boom,
CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY AND THE TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE 38
(Helen Burley, 2012) (eBook).
31 UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A sequel, UNCTAD 96 (2014)
(eBook).
32 See Roberts, supra note 3.
29
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in their decisions to ensure reappointment in future cases.33 They
are also questioned for an act that could potentially constitute a
conflict of interest, kno n as double-hatting. This is here an
arbitrator also acts as an academic or a legal counsel in a different
case. Indeed, their previous position when acting as a counsel, or
their argument made in an academic paper, for example, could be a
sign of a position they would be likely to defend in a future case.
Opaque Proceedings, Low Legitimacy (Lack of Transparency)
The lack of transparency of ISDS proceedings, with justice
being administered behind closed doors, remains an important
criticism levied against the current ISDS regime. 34 Even though
this issue has been the focus of some recent reforms, ISDS
adjudicatory proceedings can still be kept fully confidential, even
in cases that encompass issues of public interest. 35 In order to
allow for more transparent proceedings, commentators often
suggest measures such as granting public access to arbitration
documents and arbitral hearings, as well as allowing the
participation of interested third-parties, such as civil society
organizations.36 Such improvements would allow for public
participation in the proceedings, which could enhance public
understanding of the process and provide all ISDS parties with a
greater understanding of the way arbitral tribunals interpret
investment protection standards.
Moreover, the lack of transparency, coupled with the
accelerated development of international investment law
jurisprudence, is considered a factor that prevent states from
participating in ISDS disputes on an equal footing. The exponential
proliferation of awards and the diffuse nature of the ad hoc system,
which lacks an organized structure to classify decisions and
identify the most important awards for jurisprudence purposes,
make it difficult for states to stay up to date with relevant
See Cleis, supra note 24, at 191-92.
See UNCITRAL, supra note 14, at 12.
35 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 3.
36 Rob Howse, Designing a Multilateral Investment Court: Issues and Options,
36 Y.B. EUR. LAW 209, 235 (2017).
33
34
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developments in ISDS jurisprudence. This task requires time and
e pertise. Ver often, it is not achieved, because of the states
limited bureaucratic resources and budget constraints.37
Long Proceedings, High Costs, and Expensive Awards
As emphasized in the previous paragraph, ISDS arbitration is
getting progressively more complex and expensive, which in turn
imposes serious barriers to the access to justice. Host countries
have faced long-lasting cases with high-value claims and awards
that were not expected when the system was created, casting doubt
on the idea that arbitration is synonymous with a speedy and lowcost method of dispute resolution. 38 39
Complexity of the cases and the open-ended nature of many of
the legal issues in dispute lead to high costs and extended lengths
of proceedings. Ultimately, this leads to the need to study
numerous previous arbitral awards and other legal sources. Due to
its complexity, investment arbitration is dominated by big law
firms that mobilize large teams of lawyers, employ sophisticated
techniques, and charge high fees for their services, further
undermining access to the mechanism. 40
In fact, case law shows that filing and winning an investment
claim takes time and requires a considerable amount of money.
The average duration of an ICSID arbitration procedure typically
takes three to four years.41 On average, the costs for each party in a
single dispute surpasses $8 million, 42 but can exceed $30 million in
some cases.43 Australia, for example, is reported to have spent
nearly $40 million on a recent dispute against a cigarette

See Roberts, supra note 3.
See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 4.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, ICSID 898 (Aug. 2, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with ICSID).
42 See David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community, OECD Working Papers
on International Investment 24 (2012).
43 See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 41, at 19.
37
38
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company.44
Arbitrators fees alone cost, on average, $700,000,45 which is
estimated to represent just 16 percent of the total cost of arbitration
proceedings.46 Legal counsel represents the largest cost component
to the parties which are estimated to represent, on average,
82 percent of the total arbitration cost. Meanwhile, institutional
costs payable to organizations that administer the arbitration
process amount to about 2 percent of the total.47
Therefore, it is understandable that certain respondent States
may struggle to come up with the significant resources required to
properly defend themselves in the current ISDS system.48 At the
same time, the average cost for arbitration in the ICSID and the
average time for the conclusion of a case are also a concern for
investors with limited resources, especially small and medium
ones.49 In that sense, the ISDS mechanism, despite allowing
foreign investors to have direct access to international arbitration,
could be considered an ineffective regime that only protects the
wealthiest investors, since only a few could be able to take
advantage of it.50
Other elements that exacerbate the mechanism s fla s are the
high-value claims and expensive awards verified in arbitral
proceedings. Many ISDS claims now exceed $1 billion,51 and have
reached $114 billion,52 which would present a challenge to the
public finances of any country, let alone developing ones.53

See id.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 394.
46 See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 41, at 19.
47 See id.
48 See Howse, supra note 35, at 231.
49 See Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 380.
50 See id.
51 See TIENHAARA, supra note 10, at 683.
52 See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 3.
53 See TIENHAARA, supra note 10, at 686.
44
45
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III.

The Proposals to Reform the ISDS

Notwithstanding the long-standing criticism over the ad hoc
ISDS the best way to address the current crisis remains unclear.
There are three main courses of action being considered. One is the
creation of an ICS, which is the most radical departure from the
current system and is being voiced by the EU and its allies. It
envisages the comprehensive replacement of the current system
with a two-tier permanent court made up of functionally
independent judges with fixed terms. An intermediate approach is
the simple establishment of an appellate body aimed at enhancing
the consistency of the decisions issued by the arbitral tribunals,
while maintaining the core principles of the ad hoc system. Finally,
the third course of action would be the adoption of incremental
modifications to the current system in order to address the main
concerns that have been voiced against it, all while maintaining its
main characteristics.54
The division proposed in this article is envisaged to better assess the current
initiatives to reform the ISDS. It differs significantly from the authors who
analyze the issue under the criteria of depth of the reform, for whom the reform
of the ISDS is divided in three main camps: 1. Incrementalists view the
criticisms of the current system as overblown and argue that Investor-State
arbitration remains the best option available. Hence, they favor retaining the
existing dispute resolution system but instituting modest reforms that would
redress specific concerns. 2. Systemic reformers see merit in retaining investors
ability to file claims directly on the international level, but view Investor-State
arbitration as a seriously flawed system for dealing with such claims. They
champion more significant, systemic reforms, such as replacing Investor-State
arbitration with a MIC and appellate body. 3. Paradigm shifters dismiss the
existing system as irrevocably flawed and in need of wholesale replacement.
They reject the utilit of investors making international claims against states,
whether before arbitral tribunals or international courts. They embrace a variety
of alternatives, such as domestic courts, ombudsmen, and State-to-State
arbitration. Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform
of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 Am. J. Int l La 1 (2018). See also Sergio
Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the
Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT L LAW 361, (2018). at 363. They
classify the changes under the criteria of institutional alternatives for resolving
investment disputes, such as negotiation and mediation; domestic dispute
settlement mechanisms such as courts, specialized processes and ombudsman
offices; independent interstate adjudicatory mechanisms such as ad hoc tribunals
and international courts; and international adjudicatory mechanisms as
54
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a.

The International Court System

The EU has championed the idea of a permanent court. The
majority of EU countries have traditionally been enthusiastic
participants of the system. In 2014, however, while reacting to a
public consultation55 on investment protection amid growing
concerns over the ISDS in the context of the TTIP negotiations, the
Europeans came to advocate for a permanent court to settle
disputes between investors and states, first for the TTIP and later
for other trade agreements.56 Even though the TTIP negotiations
ended in 2017, the EU managed to implement a permanent
investment court in its bilateral agreements with Canada, 57
Vietnam (EU-Vietnam FTA),58 Singapore (EU-Singapore FTA),59
and Mexico (EU-Mexico FTA).60 In 2017, UNCITRAL entrusted
its WG III with a mandate to work on a possible reform of the
ISDS. One of the reform options being considered by WG III is the
creation of a permanent court, whose arbitrators would be tasked
with resolving ISDS cases that fall under its jurisdiction.61 WG III
has identified several concerns with the current ISDS system. In
the next section, we analyze how a permanent court would be
likely to address those concerns.

complementary, which include the international review of domestic decisions,
international claims after domestic proceedings and interpretation at the request
of national courts.
55 See Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state
dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
Agreement (TTIP), European Commission 25 (Jan. 13, 2015) (on file with
European Commission).
56 The Multilateral Investment Court project, European Commission (Dec. 21,
2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 (last visited Jan
23, 2019).
57 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, Oct. 30, 2016.
58 EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement, EU-Viet, 2018.
59 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of
Singapore, EU-Sing, Oct. 19, 218.
60 EU-Mexico Trade Agreement, EU-Mex., Apr. 21, 2018.
61 See UNCITRAL, supra note 15.
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i.

The ICS and the Shortcomings of the ISDS

Ensuring the Consistency and Predictability of Tribunal
Awards
Champions of the ICS argue that a permanent court would
address the ISDS concerns in many ways. As for the lack of
consistency, predictability, and certainty of tribunal awards, its
advocates state that a consistent jurisprudence can only arise when
the parties are obligated to use the same court for the settlement of
various disputes. A permanent tribunal would thus ensure the
performance of a fixed group of judges for a certain period of time,
as well as the opportunity for interaction on a repeated basis, which
could potentially reinforce the consistency and coherence of
awards.62
A standing body of jurists who repeatedly examine a large
number of cases and capture the evolution of the doctrine would
likely be in a privileged position to construct a stable jurisprudence
based on precedent case law, thus enhancing the predictability of
the system as a whole. 63 Moreover, two key characteristics of
permanent courts the exclusive dedication and repeated
interactions of its members provide for a higher level of
engagement and a greater responsibility as an institution, which
tends to circumscribe their actuation under the constitutive
instruments of the body,64 thus preventing undesirable outcomes,
such as the emergence of inconsistent case law. Besides that, a
permanent court, by accumulating the competence over a high
number of cases, can enact provisions that consolidate parallel
proceedings to avoid different outcomes arising from similar
facts.65
See Feldman, supra note 19, at 9.
See Howse, supra note 35, at 226.
64 See Feldman, supra note 19.
65 See Article 8.43 - Consolidation (CETA), Lewik,
https://www.lewik.org/term/11197/article-843-consolidation-ceta/
(Last visited Nov. 3, 2019) When t o or more claims that have been submitted
separately pursuant to Article 8.23 have a question of law or fact in common and
arise out of the same events or circumstances, a disputing party or the disputing
parties, jointly, may seek the establishment of a separate division of the Tribunal
pursuant to this Article and request that such division issue a consolidation order
62
63
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The abovementioned improvement carries an important side
effect with it: the more consistent and predictable the system is, the
more prepared the states will be to self-regulate in a way that
avoids future disputes. Consequently, there would be a reduction in
the so-called chilling effect 66 on new regulations that pursue
public policy objectives, given that members would be more aware
of their regulatory boundaries than they are today. The final result
would be more investment and better-designed public policy
measures.
More Mechanisms to Pursue the Correctness of Awards
Apart from enhancing consistency, the ICS proposal also aims
to provide additional alternatives to ensure the correctness of
arbitral awards. As emphasized in the previous section, the ICSID
Arbitration Rules provide very few possibilities for the revision
and annulment of arbitral awards, possible only on the grounds of
serious events.67 Proponents of the ICS advocate for more
alternatives to revise awards in the event of procedural or
substantial errors of law, including the re-examination of the case
( request for consolidation ). See also supra note 57, at 75. Article 3.59.1: In
case that two or more claims submitted under this Section have a question of law
or fact in common and arise out of the same events and circumstances, the
respondent may submit to the President of the Tribunal a request for the
consolidation of such claims or part thereof.
66 See Howse, supra note 35, at 235
hich invites regulator chill, leading
to uncertainty
about the policy space available for States to pursue legitimate regulatory
objectives
in the public interest. .
67 See ICSID Convention, supra note 22. The only circumstance under which a
revision can be required, as stated by the Arbitration Rule 51 of the ICSID
convention: [a] party can apply for revision of the award if it discovers a new
fact that could decisively affect that award (Article 51 of the ICSID Convention,
Arbitration Rules 50, 51, 53 and 54). The new fact must have been unknown to
the Tribunal and the applicant hen the a ard as rendered, and the applicant s
ignorance of the fact cannot be due to negligence. As for requests of
annulment, Arbitration Rule 52 enumerates five circumstances: a) improper
constitution of the tribunal, b) excess of power, c) corruption, d) departure from
a fundamental rule of procedure and e) failure to state the reasons on which the
award is based.
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by conducting a comprehensive and fresh analysis of the facts or a
limited analysis through checking manifest errors in the
appreciation of facts.68 Therefore, it seems clear that the ICS
proposal, encompassing a double-tiered tribunal with an appellate
body entrusted with the responsibility of reviewing first-instance
awards, would provide a greater possibility of ensuring the
integrity of the decisions.
Part Appointment Affecting Arbitrators Independence and
Impartiality
A permanent tribunal is also likely to address the concerns over
the lack of independence and impartiality resulting from the party
appointment of arbitrators on ISDS ad hoc tribunals. Establishing
an objective criterion to appoint judges to cases, which would
replace the party-appointment system, is already an important step
towards adjudicative impartiality. 69 Adjudicators that do not rely
on parties to appoint them to a case will naturally enjoy more
autonom to decide the cases, independentl of parties interests.
Besides that, by maintaining a permanent body of adjudicators
that is also financially independent from investors influence, the
ICS would be in a better position to implement an ambitious code
of conduct that prohibits arbitrators from acting as a counsel in
pending or new investment disputes, as well as from being
assigned to cases that would create direct or indirect conflicts of
interest.70 Indeed, it is difficult to envisage such a strict code of
See Commission staff working document impact assessment. Multilateral
reform of investment dispute resolution, European Union 11 (2017), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0302 (last visited
Jan 23, 2019).
69 See supra note 25, 2011-21; see also Howse, supra note at 235.
70 Some provisions in this regard are already in place in some agreements
negotiated by the EU. See
Article 8.30.1 - Consolidation (CETA), Lewik,
https://www.lewik.org/term/11183/article-830-ethics-ceta/ (Last visited Nov. 3,
2019), which prohibits adjudicators from acting as counsel or as a partyappointed expert or witness in any pending or new investment dispute under
CETA or any other international agreement a rule that does not exist in the
ICSID convention. The same article also impedes members of the tribunal from
being affiliated with any government, from taking instructions from any
organization or government with regard to matters related to the dispute, and
68
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conduct in the current ISDS, where arbitrators have no assurance
of future income and are thus compelled to find other sources of
income. Since those individuals have considerable knowledge
about international investment dispute resolution, they naturally
tend to use their expertise by acting in other positions in ISDS
cases.
Transparency
Given that the concern over lack of transparenc or justice
being administered behind closed doors remains an important
criticism levied against the current ISDS regime, 71 it is expected
that the prospective ICS is likely to address the issue of
transparency. Demands for greater transparency in investment
dispute proceedings include the possibility of non-party
intervention (amicus curiae briefs), disclosure of documents and
information from the proceedings, as well as publicly accessible
hearings.72
One indication that the procedural rules of the prospective ICS
would focus heavily on the issue of transparency comes from the
permanent investment courts established in the new agreements
that the EU recently negotiated with Canada, Vietnam, Singapore,
and Mexico. By incorporating the UNCITRAL Transparency
Rules with some modifications these agreements require that
the hearings, written submissions, tribunal awards, and the relevant
documents of the dispute be open to the public, unless there is a
need to protect confidential and sensible information. Moreover,
the transparency provisions of those agreements allow for amicus
curiae briefs, stipulating the circumstances under which nondisputing parties can participate in the proceedings. 73
Apart from granting a greater level of transparency, the
from participating in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct
or indirect conflict of interest. See also Article 3.40.1 supra note 57 at 53.
71 UNCITRAL 2017, supra note 15, at 7.
72 See Howse, supra note 35, at 235.
73 Transparency provisions are placed on the article 8.36 of the CETA; article 46
of the Dispute Settlement Chapter of EU-Vietnam FTA, and article 19 of EUMexico FTA, and annex 8 of the EU-Singapore FTA.
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incorporation of those rules by permitting the oversight of the
proceedings, would allow for a greater understanding of the
adjudicators judgments. It could represent a paradigmatic shift
from a system where case law evolves without proper awareness to
one where the relevant stakeholders would be able to better assess
the prevailing understandings and doctrines regarding the language
of IIAs, thus improving the consistency and predictability of the
system.
Reducing the Costs and Duration of Proceedings: The Issue of
Access to Justice
The high costs and excessive duration of the proceedings are
emphasized by UNCITRAL WG III as the main concerns of the
ISDS and are addressed in the ICS. ISDS costs are constructed of
fees paid to arbitrators, administrative fees charged by arbitral
institutions and fees paid by the parties to their counsels for legal
representation and for experts. 74 As highlighted in the previous
section, the lion s share of ISDS costs are spent on legal counsel, 75
whereas costs for arbitrators and tribunal fees constitute only a
small portion of it.76 Thus, ISDS tribunal proceedings entail very
low overhead costs.77 A permanent court, on the other hand, would
require permanent funding to cover the salary of its permanent
bod of adjudicators, as ell as the maintenance of the tribunal s
structure.
This rationale could lead to the conclusion that an ICS would
increase ISDS costs. However, it is reasonable to assume that the
standardization of adjudication procedures would bring efficiency
to dispute resolution and make it less time-consuming. This would
See supra note 14, at 9-10.
See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 41, at 15.
76 See Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Damages and costs in investment
treaty arbitration revisited, THE INT L J. COM. TREATY ARB. (2017),
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1151755/damages-and-costs-ininvestment-treaty-arbitration-revisited (last visited Jan 23, 2019). The authors
conclude that the sum of costs paid to legal counsel and experts ($10.9 million)
is approximately 9.85 times greater than the average tribunal cost ($1.1 million).
77 See Joerg Risse, A new "investment court system" Reasonable Proposal or
Nonstarter?, Global Arbitration News (Sept. 25, 2015),
https://globalarbitrationnews.com/investment-court-system-20150925.
74
75
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presumably lead to a reduction in the hours worked by experts and
legal counsel, thus decreasing the overall money spent on the
largest cost component of the ISDS.78 A more consistent
jurisprudence can reduce discrepancies among the value of awards,
bringing more certainty to how much parties are expected to spend
to bring a case before an investment tribunal.
Furthermore, an ICS, by concentrating numerous disputes in
the same adjudicative body, would increase the economies of scale
by consolidating the various claims that have arisen from the same
circumstance. Take, as an e ample, Argentina s response to its
financial crises, which generated several disputes with investors
from different countries, even though the background and the
causes of the claims were the same. 79 In such a case, ad hoc
tribunals are likely to spend time and energy on each individual
claim under a different tribunal, whereas an ICS could consolidate
those claims, thus sparing important resources.
Moreover, the ICS would also permit the elaboration of a
scheme envisaged to reduce the burden that some users currently
face in filing a claim for international investment arbitration. While
a permanent court would require permanent funding to cover
overhead costs, these could be favorably allocated to certain
categories of economically disadvantaged users taking into
consideration their capacit to cover the tribunal s costs. Under
such mechanism, both developing countries and small and medium
enterprises would benefit.
A more predictable s stem also tends to reduce the parties
expenses on legal counsel and experts. The lack of a rule of
binding precedent may place a burden on parties and their legal
counsels to submit all available arguments, irrespective of whether
those arguments have been accepted or rejected by earlier
tribunals.80 The fact that many legal issues remain unsettled
See Robert W. Schwieder, TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New
(and Improved?) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication, COLUMB. J.
TRANSNAT L L., 178, 199 (2016).
79 See Howse, supra note 35.
80 See Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform)
78

40

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

imposes the necessity on legal counsel and experts to invest
extensive resources into studying numerous previous arbitral wards
in order to develop a legal position. 81 Ultimately, all these costs are
borne by the parties of the ISDS disputes.
ICS and the Balance of Power
In addition to the points debated above, an ICS would be in a
better position to fix the opposing forces that currently threaten the
equilibrium of disputes between investors and states. The vague
wording of existing IIAs82 allow adjudicators to make overly broad
interpretations, while the ad hoc nature of the ISDS system allows
the parties to choose arbitrators who are more susceptible to
deciding the case according to their interests. 83 This combination
exacerbates the risk of an asymmetrical power balance between
investors and states. This risk is especially high in disputes
involving billionaire multinational companies that are able to
devote considerable financial resources to elite arbitrators/counsel
who are anchored in commercial law firms. 84 Moreover, the lack of
mechanisms to oversee such risks enhances the widespread
sentiment of distrust in the ISDS.85 Therefore, the settlement of
disputes in a more institutionalized regime would provide greater
levels of independence and create control mechanisms that, in turn,
would reduce the risks of adjudicators exceeding their mandates.
ii.

Trade-offs and Practical Difficulties of the ICS

The shift from the ad hoc ISDS to an ICS implies certain costs
and drawbacks that do not exist under the current system. A
permanent court would result in overhead costs to maintain its
physical facilities, along with the necessity to pay the salaries of a
on the work of its thirty-fourth session, supra note 72, at 8.
81 See UNCTAD, supra note 5.
82 Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 43 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT L L. 56 (2001),
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/165 (last visited Jan 23, 2019). He
argues that the inclusion of intentionall vague terms in IIAs are designed to
give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to articulate a variety of rules
necessar to achieve the treat s object and purpose in particular disputes.
83 See Schweider, supra note 76.
84 See Howse, supra note 35.
85 See TIENHAARA, supra note 10.
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standing body of judges costs that do not currently exist. Another
negative aspect of an ICS would be the lack of finality that could
result from the adoption of an appellate mechanism. Advocates of
this argument opine that the great merits of arbitration its speed
and finality would eventually be undermined in an appeals
system that would likely be frequently invoked. 86 While this
criticism merits consideration, it is worth recalling that an appellate
body has the function of ensuring the correctness of award
decisions and enhancing the legitimacy of the system. Moreover,
the extra costs and delays that may arise from an ICS can be
compensated and even surpassed by the gains of scale and
efficiency achieved through a greater standardization of
procedures, as addressed in the previous section.
The ICS also faces criticism over the practical difficulties of its
implementation. First, the highly diverse universe of more than
3,000 international investment agreements, each with their
different wordings and negotiation histories, would add a high
degree of complexity to the operation of the court, especially in the
development of consistent jurisprudence. 87 Other issues include the
lack of specialized personnel that would form the pool of
arbitrators of the ICS, its ability to select high-quality judges,88 and
whether they would really be any different from the experts who
regularly intervene in Investor-State arbitrations. 89 Furthermore, as
See Michael Wood, Choosing between Arbitration and a Permanent Court:
Lessons from Inter-State Cases, 32 ICSID REVIEW 1-16 (2017). See also
Feldman, supra note 19.
87 See Howse, supra note 35.
88 See Wood, supra note 84.
89 Nikos Lavranos, The Sho coming of he P opo al fo an In e na ional
Co S em (ICS) EFILA Blog (2016), https://efilablog.org/2016/02/02/theshortcomings-of-the-proposal-for-an-international-court-system-ics/ (last visited
Jan 23, 2019). Apart from this danger, it remains doubtful whether a sufficient
number of appropriately qualified individuals with the necessary expertise can
be found. This is particularly true since many professionals currently working in
arbitration may be excluded on the basis that they could be considered to be
biased. The pool of TFI and AT judges would seem to be limited to academics,
(former) judges and (former) Governmental officials. That might not be
sufficient to guarantee the practical experience and expertise needed and/or
independence from the State.
86
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is frequently invoked by the arbitration industry, the partyappointment system has the effect of enhancing investor trust in
the ISDS. Therefore, in such a system where only the states would
be able to establish arbitrators, the investors trust in the s stem
could be undermined.90
Although this shift would certainly bring several collateral
effects, as is the case for any paradigm shift, its consequences
should not be appraised individually, since they could be
compensated by other advantages. Indeed, case studies show that
most ISDS cases deal with only a few disciplines, with similar
wordings, contradicting the affirmation that the more than 3,000
IIAs would make it difficult for an ICS to develop consistent
jurisprudence.
Even though it may be true that there might be a shortage of
individuals in the pool of arbitrators in the first years after the
implementation of an ICS, its implementation is likely to generate,
throughout the years, the specialized personnel required for its
proper functioning. As for the overhead costs that would be created
by an ICS, it is reasonable to assume that the gains of scale caused
by the consolidation of multiple cases under a single tribunal
would equal or even surpass this burden. Likewise, investor
distrust arising from the elimination of party appointment would be
compensated through improving the consistency and the
predictability of the system as a whole.
b.

Appeals Mechanism

The creation of an appeals mechanism would represent an
intermediate reform of the international investment dispute
resolution mechanism by creating a standing body of jurists with
the competence to review decisions of the arbitral tribunals, while
maintaining the functioning dynamics of the ad hoc system in
keeping with the interests of the arbitration industry. This reform
option is envisaged to address some of the most common concerns
over the ISDS, which were already addressed in the previous
Id. The pre-selection of the TFI and AT judges by the Contracting Parties
carries the inherent risk of selecting pro-State individuals, in particular since
the are paid b the States (or rather their ta pa ers) alone.
90

43

THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AMIDST CRISIS, COLLAPSE,
AND REFORM

sections. These include the lack of mechanisms to ensure the
correctness of tribunal awards, as well as a lack of consistency and
predictability in the system. On the other hand, it does not tackle
other issues, such as the impact of party appointment on the
impartiality and independence of arbitrators and the lack of
transparency.
The idea of the creation of an appellate body in the ICSID
emerged within the last decade. Similar schemes were effectively
negotiated in some regional agreements mainly by the United
States with the Dominican Republic and Central America
(CAFTA-DR), Singapore, Peru, Morocco, Korea, and Chile. 91
Apart from the e amples coming from the US, India s ne est
generation of BITs also indicates an openness to a future appellate
mechanism.92
In 2004, the ICSID discussed the implementation of an appeals
mechanism in a discussion paper on possible improvements to the
investment arbitration framework. 93 More recently, this option
resurged in discussions on the reform of the international
investment regime as a means to achieve greater consistency,
coherence, and predictability in investment arbitration case law, 94
and it is frequently suggested even by the arbitration community. 95
Although an appeals facility was negotiated on these IIAs, they were never
implemented.
92 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, Investment Policy Hub
(2015), https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3560 (last
visited Dec 02, 2018). Article 29. Appeals Facility. The Parties may by
agreement or after the completion of their respective procedures regarding the
enforcement of this Treaty may establish an institutional mechanism to develop
an appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by
tribunals.
93 Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration,
Icsid.worldbank.org (2004),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Possible%20Improvements
%20of%20the%20Framework%20of%20ICSID%20Arbitration.pdf (last visited
Feb 3, 2019).
94 See Feldman, supra note 19. See also Elsa Sardinha, The Impetus for the
Creation of an Appellate Mechanism, 32 ICSID REVIEW - FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL 503-527 (2017).
95 See Nikos Lavranos, supra note 87. The European Federation for Investment
91
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The EU also intends for its prospective MIC to possibly serve as
the appeals mechanism for some countries that might prefer to
settle their investment disputes within the current ad hoc system,
but nevertheless might want the opportunity to review the
decisions it issues. In a paper submitted to WG III in January 2019,
where the EU outlines its proposal to establish a permanent
Multilateral Investment Court, it proposes an open architecture
scheme that ensures a certain level of flexibility to accommodate
the interests of such countries. 96
Theoretically, the establishment of an appeals mechanism
would have the advantage of addressing some of the main concerns
over the ISDS, while avoiding the abovementioned practical
difficulties of an ICS and resistance from stakeholders interested in
maintaining the status quo. Moreover, it would provide an
alternative way to ensure the correctness of arbitral awards and
promote the emergence of a consistent set of rules through the
repeated examination of similar cases by a permanent group of
judges, which is only possible when parties are required to use the
same tribunal for dispute resolution. 97 By promoting consistency
and predictability, and reducing the risks of conflicting decisions,
an appellate mechanism could restore faith in the ISDS, thus
enhancing its legitimacy and sustainability over the long term.
Whereas an appeals mechanism would maintain some of the
main features of the ad hoc regime, it would drastically change
other characteristics that have been portrayed as big advantages of
the current ISDS. While appellate review could provide an
alternative way of ensuring the integrity of arbitral awards, it could
also severely undermine some of the great merits of the current
Law and Arbitration (EFILA), reacting to the European proposal to establish an
ICS during the TTIP negotiations, suggested that the US and the EU should
also consider whether it would not be more preferable to modify and Improve
existing systems, such as turning the ICSID annulment procedure into a full
appeal mechanism.
96 Submission establishing a standing mechanism for the settlement of
international investment disputes, Trade.ec.europa.eu, at 9 (2019),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/157631.htm (last visited Feb 11, 2019).
97 See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, at 24 (2005).
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ISDS, which are efficiency and finality. 98 Besides that, as
emphasized in the previous section, it is expected that parties
would face extra costs and more delays in an appeals system, as it
is reasonable to assume that it would be frequently invoked by the
losing parties.
c.

ICSID Reform

The Establishment Strikes Back

The ICSID was established in 1966 and is the orld s leading
institution dedicated to international investment dispute settlement,
having administered the majority of all international investment
disputes, which amounts to more than 600 cases to date. 99 The
ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules are frequently subject
to improvements and have already been amended to address
concerns over transparency, independence, the impartiality of
arbitrators, and time effectiveness.100
In the realm of the current ISDS crisis, the ICSID Secretariat
initiated consultations in late 2016 with its Member States and the
general public to identify areas where further reform might be
needed. A similar invitation was issued to the public in early 2017.
This marks the fourth rule-amendment process and is the most
extensive review to date.101 The stated goals of this review are to
modernize, simplify and streamline the rules, while also reducing
the environmental footprint of ICSID proceedings. However, the
process of consultation with Member States and the public resulted
in 16 areas for potential amendments, which coincide with several
areas for possible improvement already identified by UNCITRAL
See Ian Laird & Rebecca Askew, Finality Versus Consistency: Does InvestorState Arbitration Need an Appellate System, 7 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE
PRACTICE AND PROCESS, AT 298 (2005),
http://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol7/iss2/9 (last visited
Jan 25, 2019).
99 See ICSID, Icsid.worldbank.org (2018),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx (last visited Jan 25,
2019).
100 ICSID Amendments, Icsid.worldbank.org (2018),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Pages/About/about.aspx (last visited
Jan 25, 2019).
101 Id.
98

46

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

WG III.102
The EU s proposal to establish a t o-tier tribunal with a
permanent body of adjudicators and an appellate body is a radical
departure from the existing ISDS regime. The creation of such a
tribunal, with a significant support among states, would be a major
threat to the ICSID s e istence. 103 Therefore, the launch of such an
extensive review process by the ICSID seems to indicate that the
ICSID Secretariat is concerned about a radical reshaping of the
ISDS regime that could be harmful to its own existence. It is also
an indication that the ICSID is not willing to participate in the
EU s initiative. Instead, such an initiative shows that the ICSID
List of Topics for Potential ICSID Rule Amendment, Icsid.worldbank.org
(2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/List of Topics for
Potential ICSID Rule Amendment-ENG.pdf (last visited Jan 25, 2019). The
potential areas for amendment of ICSID rules are: 1. Review Procedure for
Appointment and Disqualification of Arbitrators, Explore Feasibility of Code of
Conduct for Arbitrators, 2. Clarify Rules on Preliminary Objections and
Bifurcation 3. Explore Possible Provisions on Consolidation of Proceedings and
Parallel Proceedings 4. Modernize Institution Rules, Means of Communications
and Filing of Briefs and Supporting Documentation, and General Functions of
the Secretariat 5. Modernize and Simplify Rules concerning the First Session,
Procedural Consultation and Pre-Hearing Conference 6. Modernize Rules on
Witnesses and Experts and Other Evidence 7. Explore Possible Provisions for
Suspension of Proceedings and Clarify Rules on Discontinuance when Parties
Fail to Act 8. Reflect Best Practices for Preparation of Award, Separate and
Dissenting Opinions 9. Explore Presumption in Favor of Allocating Costs to the
Prevailing party, Possible Provisions on Security for Costs and Security for Stay
of Enforcement of Awards 10. Review Provisions on Provisional Measures 11.
Clarify and Streamline Procedure in Annulment Proceedings 12. Review and
Modernize Provisions on Costs, Fees and Payment of Advances, and
Discontinuance for Failure to Pay Advances 13. Explore Possible Provisions on
Transparency, Clarify Rules on Non-Disputing party Participation 14. Improve
Time and Cost Efficiency and Explore Feasibility of Guide for Efficient
Conduct of Process 15. Explore Possible Provisions on Third party Funding 16.
Streamline Additional Facility Rules for Non-ICSID Convention Cases.
103 Not ithstanding the natural outcome of the ICS s success being the decline
in ICSID s membership, there are still legal options for the ICSID to participate
in the EU s initiative, either b providing administrative support, serving as a
forum for negotiations, or even serving as the organization onto which the new
mechanism might be docked. See N. Jansen Calamita, The Challenge of
Establishing a Multilateral Investment Tribunal at ICSID, 32 ICSID REVIEW
611-624 (2017).
102
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strives for the continuity of the current regime and aims to solve
the concerns that gave rise to dissatisfaction with the ISDS.
ICSID s Effort to Impro e Consistenc
Much has been discussed about the ability of ad hoc tribunals
to enhance the consistency of awards. Despite ICSID tribunals
using ad hoc arbitration to settle international investment disputes
on the basis of heterogeneous treaty provisions, there is a tendency
among ICSID tribunals to develop a homogeneous methodology
regarding international law. 104 However, ICSID could do
significantly more to enhance the consistency of the awards issued
by its numerous tribunals. 105
In the current amendment process, ICSID is innovating by
introducing options for the consolidation and coordination of
claims.106 The consolidation proceedings include the appointment
of the same arbitrators to hear otherwise separate cases, organizing
joint hearings, or ensuring that the awards are rendered
simultaneously. The consolidation of claims tends to reduce the
costs of proceedings and improve the consistency of the awards in
cases where the background of the disputes is identical or similar.
This novelty in the ICSID Arbitration Rules replicates some
provisions on the consolidation and coordination of claims already
in place for the permanent courts recently negotiated by the
European Union.107
Moreover, some of the proposed rules aimed at enhancing
transparency indirectly help to prevent inconsistencies. The
proposed AR 48, which regulates the submission of non-disputing
parties (NDP), states in its paragraph five, that the Tribunal ma
provide the NDP with access to relevant documents filed in the
Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals - An
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 301-364
(2008).
105 Id.
106 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper,
Icsid.worldbank.org (2018),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/Amendments_Vol_3_Complete_WP+
Schedules.pdf (last visited Jan 26, 2019), AR 38 and 38 bis.
107 See article 8.43.1 of CETA. See also article 3.59.1 of the EU
Vietnam FTA.
104
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proceeding, unless either part objects. 108 By allowing the
tribunal to order the production of case documents, the parties
would better understand case law, focus their arguments more
precisely, and predict likely outcomes more accurately. The parties
and their legal counsel would be able to enhance their
comprehension of similar provisions in other cases. Over time, the
disclosure of case law documents would be expected to produce
more predictability and consequently more consistent awards.
Revision, Annulment and the Trade-off Between Finality and
Correctness
Whereas the ICS discussions on addressing the limited
mechanisms to ensure correctness of awards include establishing
an appellate tribunal with the competence to review first-instance
a ards, the ICSID s proposed amendment onl aims at
streamlining the rules of procedures governing the interpretation,
revision, and annulment of awards, as well as codifying ICSID
practices, in relation to post-award remedy proceedings.109
A more comprehensive reform aimed at ensuring the
correctness of tribunal awards, such as the establishment of an
appellate body in the ICSID framework, has proved very difficult
in the past. Criticisms of these changes range from a loss of finality
to the increased cost and duration of ISDS proceedings. Therefore,
it is expected that a possible outcome of the current reform, in this
regard, would not include comprehensive changes to the current
rules. Instead, the proposals unveiled so far show a preference for
the improvement of existing mechanisms, rather than the creation
of broader mechanisms for the revision and annulment of
awards.110

See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, at 212-13.
109 See id., at 270.
110 It is important to emphasize that the ICSID has received several comments on
this issue during the process of consultation with its Member States and the
public. A noteworthy opinion from a law firm argues for the necessity of a
collegial body to scrutinize awards in order to pressure the tribunal to keep the
quality and timing of awards acceptable. According to the commentators, there
is a considerable and growing disparity in this regard, which is reinforced by the
108
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Addressing Independence and Impartiality While Maintaining
the Status Quo
ICSID amendment proposals also envisage addressing the issue
of independence and impartiality of adjudicators. The proposed
changes do not abandon the current scheme of party appointment,
and instead only improve certain provisions that could affect the
arbitrators independence and impartialit . The process of
challenging arbitrators, for example, has been revised, including
the introduction of an expedited schedule for parties filing a
challenge, as well as an enhanced declaration of independence and
impartiality.111 Moreover, ICSID together with UNCITRAL
Secretarial are working on a Code of Conduct for arbitrators aimed
at ensuring the consistency of ethical requirements across all the
major sets of rules used for ISDS.112 Once final, this Code of
Conduct would be added as an amendment to the ICSID rules.
Furthermore, the information disclosure requirements from
arbitrators appointed at the start of a case have been increased. The
new declaration requires the disclosure of significant relationships
within the last five years between the appointee and the parties, the
parties counsel, other members of the tribunal, third-party funders,
and any involvement in other Investor-State cases, in any

absence of scrutiny during the enforcement stage, as well as a lack of review
during the annulment stage, which could pressure tribunal members to be more
attentive to quality. However, such broader suggestions have not been
incorporated to the proposed rules for amendment thus far. See Public
Comments to Amendment of ICSID s Rules and Regulations,
Icsid.worldbank.org (2019),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/Public%20Comments%20to%2
0Amendment%20to%20ICSID%20Rules%20and%20Regulations.pdf (last
visited Jan 25, 2019), at 155.
111 See Backgrounder on Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules,
Icsid.worldbank.org (2018),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/Amendment_Backgrounder.pdf (last
visited Jan 25, 2019).
112 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Synopsis,
Icsid.worldbank.org, at 5 (2018),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Documents/Homepage/Amendments
-Vol_1_Synopsis_EN,FR,SP.pdf (last visited Jan 25, 2019).
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capacity.113 Those are clearly provisions aimed at reducing the
chances of double-hatting and will likely prevent conflicts of
interest during the selection process by providing the parties with
more complete information on how to instruct a disqualification
claim.
The proposed rules, however, do not intend to prohibit doublehatting, but only to provide more detailed information to assess
whether a de facto conflict exists.114 Instead, their aim is to
enhance transparency and enable parties to consider potential
conflicts of interest derived from double-hatting on a case-by-case
basis.115
Transparency of Proceedings
The current amendment process includes several provisions
aimed at increasing the transparency of proceedings. The relations
between parties and third-party funders, which have long been an
issue of concern in the current system, are further codified to
introduce an obligation to the parties to disclose whether they have
third-party funding, along with the source of that funding.116 The
identity of the funder is required to be disclosed to potential
arbitrators before their appointment, to avoid conflicts of interest.
Once more, the proposed rules demonstrate the preference for a
less dramatic departure from the existing rules, opting for
See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, AR 26.
114 These options tend to preserve the interest of those individuals who
frequently act in more than one of such capacities. In its submission to ICSID,
Derains & Gharavi International, hich is a net ork bringing together la ers
who frequently act as arbitrator, counsel and consultant before tribunals argues
that a more restrictive rule in this regard would bring several drawbacks, such as
reducing the pool of available ICSID arbitrators. Moreover, they argue, the
arbitrator s previous e perience as counsel is beneficial to the system, as their
practical experience has great value when facing procedural or substantive
issues. Furthermore, those arbitrators that act as counsel are less likely to be
dependent on future appointments and the risks associated therewith. See Public
Comments to Amendment of ICSID s Rules and Regulations, supra note 108, at
150.
115 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, at 361.
116 See id., AR 21.
113
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enhanced transparency through the mandatory disclosure of
information, rather than the prohibition of third-party funding.
The proposed AR 57 aims for a greater participation of nondisputing parties (NDP). The possibility for NDPs to make written
submissions has existed in the ICSID rules since 2006. The
changes, however, incorporate new provisions based on practice
and experience to date and are meant to further codify NDP
participation.117
AR 57(5) would allow the tribunal to order the NDPs to have
access to relevant documents filed in the proceedings. Nonetheless,
the parties would still be capable of preventing the NDP from
accessing any document that they might classify as confidential. 118
The novelties include additional criteria for consideration when
determining whether to allow written submissions from an NDP,
such as the identification of its activity or any affiliation with a
disputing party, and whether the NDP has received any assistance
with its filing. This will allow the tribunal to better assess whether
there are any relationships between the NDP and a party.
The amendments also impose the obligation on the parties to
inform whether they have third-party funding, the source of the
funding, as well as the requirement of keeping such disclosures
updated throughout the proceeding. 119 As highlighted above, the
proposed rules also state that the name of the funder would have to
be provided to the arbitrators prior to their appointment to avoid
inadvertent conflicts of interest. Third-party funding is a longAlthough that can be interpreted as an effort to enhance transparency, it is
noteworthy that the ICSID has received submissions from organizations linked
with the arbitration industry suggesting the adoption of tougher rules regarding
amicus curiae submissions. The European Federation for Investment Law and
Arbitration (EFILA) suggests including the possibility for the tribunal to request
that an amicus provide securit for the parties reasonable costs in commenting
on the submission of the amicus as a condition for allowing the amicus to make
a submission. See Public Comments to Amendment of ICSID s Rules and
Regulations, supra note 108, at 103.
118 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, AR 57 (5).
119 See id., AR 21.
117
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standing concern that is thought to exacerbate pathologies in the
system by fueling speculative claims, as well as asymmetric
operation in favor of claimants. 120 Despite all the criticism, the
current amendment process, once more, opts for adopting a remedy
to its deficiencies rather than a complete prohibition of third-party
funding.
The consent of both parties to publish an award would still be
mandatory under the ICSID Convention that remains unchanged.
However, the proposed AR 44(2) states that consent to publish an
award would be deemed to have been given if a party has not
objected to it, in writing, within 60 days.121 Even if a party objects,
the proposed rules would permit the ICSID to publish legal
excerpts of the award, leaving the requirement undisturbed.
Therefore, although the proposed rules would remain largely
similar to the existing ones, transparency would be fostered, as the
publication of the award would come to be the general rule, rather
than the exception.122
Amendments Envisaged to Reduce the Costs of the
Proceedings
The ICSID amendments regarding financial provisions also
reflect the concerns over the increasing costs of ISDS proceedings.
The proposed rules would modify the current one to entitle
members to a fixed fee, measured only by hours of work, rather
than the current method of a flat daily fee irrespective of the
number of hours worked during the hearings. 123 The new rule
unifies the fee structure, so that all work performed is compensated
transparently, equally and exactly. Moreover, the proposed rule
See Howse, supra note 35.
See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, AR 44 (2).
122 Corroborating the view that enhanced transparency can improve the
development of consistent case la , the EFILA contends that here ICSID
Secretariat is prevented from publishing such a decision or order due to lack of
party consent, it should have the power to publish extracts, if it considers them
important for the development of international la . See Public Comments to
Amendment of ICSID s Rules and Regulations, supra note 108, at 103.
123 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, AFR 7.
120
121

53

THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AMIDST CRISIS, COLLAPSE,
AND REFORM

states that all filings would have to be done electronically, unless
there are special reasons to maintain paper filing, 124 in an attempt
to make the processes faster and less expensive.125
Notwithstanding the merits of this modification, its impact on the
overall cost of the ISDS proceedings would not be significant. 126
Furthermore, requests by tribunal members to be paid more
than the ICSID fee (currently $3,000/day) are further regulated by
Administrative Financial Regulation (AFR) 14. The proposed
amendments would simplify the financial administration of
proceedings, while ensuring that costs are transparent, predictable,
and fair.127 It therefore would contribute to keeping the parties
expenditures under their control.
AR 19 proposes another modification aimed at reducing the
costs of proceedings. It encourages tribunals to make cost orders
on an interim basis and not just in the final award, to keep parties
cost-conscious during the interlocutory stage and to help parties to
gauge the ongoing costs of a case. 128 As a result it may encourage
parties to refrain from continuing cases that could give rise to
further adverse cost orders.129
New Time Limits to Expedite Cases
Another major criticism of the ISDS that the current ICSID
amendment process also addresses is the increasing duration of
proceedings. The amendment rules set clearer and realistic
timeframes and implement options for expedited proceedings,
featuring additional and shortened timelines. The proposed AR 59
See id., AR 3 (1).
See Backgrounder on Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, supra
note 109, at 2.
126 This is the authors o n assessment. We assume that merel replacing the
flat dail fee rule to a criterion that measure b hours do ver fe to reduce the
enormous costs with legal counsel. Likewise, by replacing paper filling by
electronic filling has almost 0 effect on reducing costs.
127 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, AFR 14.
128 See id., AR 19.
129 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Synopsis, supra note
110, at 4.
124
125
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sets clear expectations for tribunal members to render the award in
a timely manner, while maintaining flexibility, based on individual
circumstances of each case. 130 It revises the current AR 46, which
deals with the preparation and timing of the award. 131 Under the
current rule, the award must be rendered within 120 days after the
close of the proceedings. However, since tribunals normally do not
close the proceedings until the award is almost finalized, this
provision rarely limits the time for deciding a case. 132
The latest available numbers on ICSID arbitration proceedings
demonstrate that the average duration, from the registration of the
case until the rendering of the award, is approximately
49 months.133 The proposed AR 59 states that awards must be
rendered within 60 days after the last submission of an application
for manifest lack of legal merit, 180 days after the last submission
on a preliminary objection, and 240 days after the last submission
on all ancillary matters.134
However, it is important to emphasize that the 240-day limit is
a best-efforts obligation under the proposed AR 8(3).135
Therefore, the amendments seek to ensure that awards be issued
more expeditiously and under clearer time limits, based on the
complexity of the case and on the amount of information it has to
deal with.136 The ICSID received numerous comments from law
See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, AR 59.
131 See ICSID Convention, supra note 22, AR 46.
132 See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra
note 104, at 257.
133 See id., at 257.
134 See id., at AR 59.
135 Proposed AR 8 (3) states that Where these Rules prescribe time limits for
orders, decisions and the Award, the Tribunal, or the Chairman, where
applicable, shall use best efforts to meet those time limits. If special
circumstances arise which prevent the Tribunal from complying with a time
limit, it shall advise the parties of the reason for delay and the date when it
anticipates the order, decision or Award will be delivered. Id.
136 The ICSID s option for such la language came despite severe criticism
received during the consultation process. In this sense: It has become too
common for extensive time to lapse, sometimes up to two years, between the
hearing and the rendering of the award and to serve standard excuses, ranging
from complexity of cases to dissents. In general, it should be made clear that it is
130
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firms and arbitration associations during the consultation period.
Most of the comments conveyed suggestions for normative
innovations aimed at increasing efficiency and celerity in the
conclusion of proceedings, which ranged from introduction of
shorter timeframes137 to best-endeavors provisions.138 The
interpretation of AR 59, alongside AR 8 (3), nonetheless makes it
clear that the ICSID has opted for the best-endeavors language
when amending its rules.
The proposed amendment introduced a new chapter with an
optional expedited arbitration procedure that would significantly
reduce the timeframes and complexity of proceedings.139 Another
unacceptable to receive awards more than a year after the evidentiary hearing,
hether or not there are post hearing briefs. Public Comments to Amendment
of ICSID s Rules and Regulations, supra note 108, at 152.
137 To increase efficienc and celerit in the conclusion of proceedings,
consider introducing the requirement that the proceedings be declared closed
within a specific time period from the end of the final hearing or the filing of the
last post-hearing ritten submissions. Id., at 200. Another comment from a law
firm suggests a rule to authori e the Secretar -General to reduce the fees of the
arbitrators where, an award has not been drawn up and signed within the
specified period of time after closure of the proceedings . Id., at 200.
Organi ations linked ith the arbitration communit proposed that ICSID
considers issuing guidelines for limiting submission length, volume of document
production, and frivolous applications, and ii) prohibition on more than one
round of post-hearing submissions. Id., at 194. EFILA, in turn, suggests
shortening of the deadlines envisaged in the procedure for constituting the
tribunal in the absence of previous agreement. Id., at 102.
138 To encourage time and cost efficiency, consider introducing a rule expressly
adopting the general principle that the tribunal and the parties shall act in an
efficient and e peditious manner Id., at 202. The practice of informing the
parties that the arbitrators fees have been reduced due to a delay in the
rendering of the award is not the correct approach. It undermines the authority of
the Tribunal in its adjudicatory function. Any process for controlling the delay
in rendering the award should remain confidential, and overseen by the ICSID
Secretariat, potentiall via the Tribunal s secretar , ithout opening up the issue
ith the Parties to the e tent possible. Id., at 152.
139 Proposed rules allow the parties to expressly opt into an expedited process for
the full arbitration within 20 days from the notice of registration. Under the
Expedited Arbitration, the parties must select arbitrators within 30 days of
registration and can opt for only one arbitrator or three-person tribunal. Under
the rules of the expedited process, the first session is held within 30 days.
Memorials and counter-memorials are each filed in 60 days and limited to 200
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noteworthy modification aimed at reducing the duration of ISDS
proceedings is the adoption of an expedited schedule for parties to
challenge arbitrators. Mentioned as one of the most prominent
causes for delays in the outcomes of ISDS proceedings, challenges
to arbitrators are deemed to increase the length of a proceeding by
65 to 82 percent.140 In order to make this process quicker, the
proposed AR 29 would introduce an expedited schedule for parties
to file a challenge.141
The new rules also require all arguments and supporting
documents to be included in the disqualification proposal, thus
transforming what could otherwise be a formally lodged challenge
into a complete written submission, which reduces the overall time
needed for the briefing. With the clear intention to minimize
potential delays in proceedings, the proposed AR 29(3) would
eliminate the automatic suspension of the proceeding upon the

pages, while replies and rejoinders may each be filed within 40 days and are
limited to 100 pages. The hearing is held within 60 days after the last written
submission. The Tribunal can extend the timetable by 30 days to address
document disclosure motions, if needed. It may also adjust the schedule if
needed for preliminary objection or ancillary claim, but retaining the expedited
nature of the process. See Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra note 104, AR 69-79.
140 This statistic comes from research being conducted by Pluricourts. Though it
is not yet finished, the data was unveiled by the delegate of Pluricourts present
at the thirty-sixth meeting of UNCITRAL Working Group III, during the session
that discussed the concerns of cost and duration of ISDS proceedings on
01\11\2018 during the afternoon. See Malcolm Langford, UNCITRAL WG III
(Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) - Speakers Log with Audio
Recordings (2018), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/audio/meetings.jsp (last
visited Jan 26, 2019).
141 Under this new schedule, a specific time limit of 20 days for filing a
disqualification motion replaces the former requirement that it should be filed
promptl . The challenge ma be proposed an time before the a ard is
rendered, since it is made within 20 days after the date on which the party first
knew or first should have known of the facts on which the proposal is based.
The disqualifications proceeding follows with a reply by the responding party
that is filed in seven days, then arbitrator observation within further five days.
After that, the parties shall file final observations simultaneously within seven
days. Finally, the decision is rendered in 30 days. See Proposals for Amendment
of the ICSID Rules
Working Paper, supra note 104, AR 29.
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filing of a challenge.142 It gives the parties the ability to decide
whether the proceeding will be suspended while the
disqualification procedure is pending.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The crisis in the ISDS system has reached a stage in which
most of its users agree that the system urgently requires reform.
While a consensus exists on this necessity, the regulatory options
and institutional reforms are still under discussion. So far, three
options have taken shape and gained relevance in international
debate.
The creation of an ICS in the form of a two-tier tribunal,
composed of permanent and financially independent adjudicators
with fixed terms, is the most radical departure from the existing
system and its successful implementation could pose a major threat
to the ad hoc ISDS. Although this option presents the best way to
address the most remarkable flaws of the ISDS, it also contains
several drawbacks in comparison with the current ad hoc system,
and its implementation presents several practical difficulties.
The simple creation of an appellate body that would be
responsible for reviewing the ad hoc tribunals a ards responds to
only one part of the criticism faced by the ISDS. It neglects other
serious problems such as the issue of party appointment and its
effect on the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. This
alternative implies curtailing some of the most heralded advantages
of the ISDS namely the celerity of the proceedings and the
finality of the tribunal awards but nonetheless leaves the ad hoc
system unchanged and would thus reduce resistance from the
arbitration industry.
Finally, the reform of the current system, represented here by
the ICSID amendment process, envisages maintaining the status
quo and making simple cosmetic changes. Arguments in favor of
maintaining the status quo are that overhead costs that do not
currently exist would not be created and that it promotes an
142

See id., AR 29 (3).
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equilibrium between the rights and interests of investors and states,
as opposed to the ICS proposal, which critics say would eventually
prevent investors from participating in the composition of
tribunals.
The trade-off between the three reform options is clear. All of
them have advantages and disadvantages, and discussions about
the most appropriate alternative to solve the current crisis is likely
to last for years. Nevertheless, discussion on this topic is welcome
at this time of grave discontent with the current investment dispute
resolution regime. With multiple ISDS reform initiatives ongoing,
policymaking in this area is in its most ebullient phase. The next
developments will demonstrate the measure of success of each
alternative. The preference of the countries for each model will
reveal whether any of the three paradigms will prevail or if the
investment dispute resolution regime will embrace the coexistence
of more than one paradigm.
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